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Abstract—The integration of the Internet-of-Things (IoT) and
Blockchain (BC) for strong trust and decentralization shows
potentials in use cases, such as supply chain tracing, smart
cities, and health care. As a great number of IoT devices
interacting in such cases, it is crucial to provide scalable and
secure mechanisms for IoT data persistence within BCs. In this
regard, sharding mechanisms have been employed to enhance
the scalability of BCs. However, disconnections and delays of a
BC’s distributed network can cause concerns for inter-shard and
inter-miner synchronizations, eventually preventing the BC from
reaching a high throughput. Thus, this work develops an IoT-
oriented permissioned BC, which covers via a scalable Distributed
Ledger (DL) a novel sharding mechanism for unstable distributed
networks. Therefore, DLIT (Distributed Ledger for IoT Data)
offers a novel two-layered transaction distribution, validation,
and inter-shard synchronization, combined with authentication
and verification mechanisms in support of a viable security level.
Index Terms—Blockchain, Distributed Ledger, Internet-of-
Things, Proof-of-Stake, Byzantine Fault Tolerance, Sharding.
I. INTRODUCTION
Blockchains (BC) support distributed data storage in an
immutable manner. This became visible during the last decade
by the emergence of cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin, which
paved the path for a strong evolution of trusted, decentralized,
and disintermediated Information Technology (IT). Besides
early cryptocurrencies, different use cases evolved around
BCs, out of which IoT plays an important role. IoT especially
focuses natively on a secure and decentralized data collection,
monitoring, analytics, and storage due to its decentralization
of IoT devices. A certain level of trust in IoT data is required
to prepare and take control decisions [15]. Hence, examples
of IoT-driven and BC-based use cases developed by time
comprise supply chain tracing [11], smart cities [13], pollution
monitoring [12], agriculture, and healthcare.
Further, BCs have evolved to a better scalability via new
consensus mechanisms, such as Proof-of-Stake (PoS), Proof-
of-Authority (PoA), or Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT) [5].
However, a combination of scalable and secure BCs has not
been reached yet. Thus, private permissioned BCs (called Dis-
tributed Ledgers, DL) have gained interest, where a consortium
of nodes is in control of managing the chain. DLs trade off
scalability and security with centralization. To enhance the
scalability of DLs, “sharding" mechanisms shown potential
[17], which leads to an improvement in scalability of a DL
with (a) an increasing number of miners added per shard and
(b) by increasing the number of shards. However, inter-shard
communications is required to synchronize miners, which









Fig. 1. IoT and Blockchain Integrated Use Cases
A second approach to foster DL scalability [14] suggests to
aggregate Transactions (Tx) on chain. Tx aggregation controls
and moderates the DL growth in size by combining multiple
Txs into a new Tx, reducing header overhead. Such a storage
optimization approach was not yet used in sharding approaches
[17]. Thus, to limit the impact of networking problems and
eventually to reach good scalability (measured in Transaction
validation rate Per Second, TPS), DLIT (Distributed Ledger
for IoT Data) as proposed integrates these two worlds and
enables a novel sharded Proof-of-Stake (PoS) consensus mech-
anism by applying Tx aggregation on validated Txs.
DLIT designs a DL with a two-layer consensus mechanism
by combining Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT) and PoS.
DLIT’s sharding mechanism removes inter-shard synchroniza-
tion requirements for state transitions. Thus, in unreliable
networking conditions, the reduced number of inter-miner
communications can be less time-demanding than a regular
sharding approach. In real world, as shown in Fig. 1, different
IoT use cases can generate high volume of Txs to be stored
in a DL. To adhere the security demands of such a high scale,
DLIT reaches high security for storing IoT data by enabling
slashing i.e., fining mechanism on malicious nodes. Block
mining is verified against the state transitions and assigned
Txs. DLIT offers a novel design in which validation processes
are separated from the Tx assignment. Consortium members
are selected randomly and perform with limited authorities.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section II formulates major concerns observed in sharding
mechanisms and introduces related work. While the design
and implementation of DLIT are presented in Section III, key
evaluation results of experiments performed with the prototype
implemented are presented in Section IV, followed by the
summary Section V.
II. SHARDING CONCERNS AND RELATED WORK
The basic idea of sharding originates from databases, where
sharding denotes the horizontal partitioning of a database
among multiple physical data stores [7] such that they can
be processed concurrently [4]. A basic DL sharding design
partitions the global Tx mempool (a memory to store a set of
Tx to be mined) according to the sender of an individual Tx.
Each shard mines a block for each height and persists it in
the DL [1]. There are various ways how a BC may implement
sharding [17] (cf. Sec. II), but in most cases inter-sharding
state transitions need to be performed between all the miners
in shards. This can cause delays even in perfect networking
conditions. Sharded BCs and DLs may run in fixed lengths
of blocks called epochs. After each epoch, the Validators (Vs)
are re-assigned to each shard. At the end of each epoch, a
finalization procedure occurs by which the next epoch block
is created and the number of new shards is determined based
on the current number of Vs in the network [1].
A. Sharding Concerns
Key concerns experienced by sharding directly relate to
the design of sharding mechanisms or are influenced by
external factors, such as peer-to-peer networking. Four of the
considerable sharding concerns include:
(i) Edge cases denote DLs being in the process of transitioning
from one epoch to the next. The problem occurs when the
sharded system is not yet prepared for transitioning to the
new epoch and some Vs are placed in two different epochs.
E.g., for a 3 Validator (V) configuration consider the case
(others exist, too), where all Vs mine the last block before the
epoch block. At this moment, V1 to V3 are leaders in Shards
S1 to S3, respectively and V2 is in S2. After mining the last
block and the assumption that V1 and V2 receive the state
transitions from V3, they continue with mining epoch block,
while V3 is waiting for the state transition from V2 due to
an unstable connection. V1 fulfills the PoS condition and can
insert the epoch block, which is received by all Vs. Thus, V1
is now in S3, V2 in S1, and V3 in S2. This new V assignment
confuses V3, since he already processed the transition from
S1, which will not be requested again, since with a shard
ID 2, no transitions from S2 are requested. Since the shard
ID 3 is now associated with V1 and if V1 receives a request
for a state transition of S3, it will answer the request with
its own state transition produced before the epoch block for
S1. V3, however, already holds this transition and it will keep
requesting it, but will never receive the expected transition. At
this moment the sharded DL cannot be recovered anymore,
because V3 cannot request the transition from the right miner.
(ii) Epoch block finality defines epoch blocks to be final
and unchangeable after creation. Since rollbacks for epoch
blocks are by definition not possible, the last epoch block
arriving can be accepted as valid in all cases. To ensure that
all Vs eventually accept the same epoch block, a timer can be
employed by which, after the epoch block’s creation, Vs have
to wait for a predefined time (e.g., 5 s) before continuing the
mining process. Thus, every V accepts the last epoch block
and when Vs start mining, all hold the same epoch block that
they attach their first block of the new epoch to. However, this
is not always achievable!
In a 2 shards and 2 Vs case consider that V1 (leader in S1)
and V2 (leader in S2) mine the last block before the epoch
block. Both succeed in mining the block and V1 receives
the state transition from V2. Assuming that the connection
between these Vs is now interrupted, V 1 can now start mining
the epoch block, broadcasts it into the network, and continues
mining the block after the epoch block. However, V2 still
waits for the state transition from V1. If V2 now receives the
transition from V1 — be it through a rebroadcast from other
nodes or by a short re-instantiation of the connection between
V1 and V2 — V2 is unaware of V1 producing the epoch block
and mines an epoch block himself. At this moment the BC
cannot be recovered anymore, because epoch blocks always
have to be final. When the connection is reestablished again,
V2 will broadcast the epoch block to V1 and the new epoch
block along with its V-shard assignment will be taken over
by V1 after it mined the first block (after the previous epoch
block). This means that one V can have two different shard
IDs within one epoch, which makes the entire transition and
request structure fail.
(iii) Networking effects pose a major challenge in operating
a DL, since missing rebroadcasts of lost transactions in an
unstable network does impact inter-miner communications
heavily. Thus, the inter-/intra-shard Tx transmission throughput
may encounter severe performance drops. Each disconnection
leads to a new request or rebroadcast, which causes additional
network load and reduces the scalability of the sharded DL.
(iv) Inter-shard communications validity is required to
ensure that the DL can be trusted. Thus, state transitions used
in a sharded DL are key and the global state of the DL has
to be maintained by inter-shard communications to validate
Tx’s reliably. By letting all shards validate all transactions, the
purpose of a sharding mechanism would be defeated! Thus,
protocols used for inter-shard communications for state tran-
sitions may only implement a naive verification mechanism.
For each state transition the shard ID and the block height of
the block, where it originated from, has to be passed to other
shards for verification. Therefore, malicious shards or even
outsiders could create state transitions with another shard’s
name, if is no identity check would be performed.
B. Mechanisms for Reliable Sharding
To overcome these sharding concerns as discussed above,
sophisticated approaches have to be considered to avoid Edge
cases, while ensuring the block finality, laid over secure
communications. Moreover, strict and precise verification of
previously mined blocks and Txs shall not be neglected. It
is crucial, too, to consider unstable networks, where com-
munication delays and disconnections cause synchronization
problems between all entities involved in the consensus mech-
anism. Otherwise, the DL will encounter Tx losses with time
consuming or even no proper recovery method at hand. Above
all, the consensus mechanism implemented has a direct impact
on the overall scalability of DLs as well.
1) Related Work: In order to offer a reliable and secure
sharding mechanism, different proposals employ proprietary
measures by the combination of sharding and respective se-
curity features. For instance, in Bazo, in order to make sure
that all miners are updated with all validated Txs, even about
the Txs which don’t belong to their shard, a protocol is used
that at a certain epoch height EH, epoch block is inserted,
denoted as ebEH in Fig. 2, which consolidates the global state
of the DL and re-assigns the validators (Vs) to the shards in
a randomized fashion. Then, Shardi with shard ID i produces
the block sbi
h at height h. Using a proprietary synchronization
mechanism, at each height h, all shards synchronize the global
state with each other in order to have the global state before
mining the next block with height h+1 [1].
Fig. 2. Epoch Block Representation by [1]
Zilliqa is one of the BCs which have implemented the
sharding feature [8]. Zilliqa’s performance increases whenever
600 additional nodes join the network as it assigns roughly this
number of nodes in each shard. The performance increase is
almost linear in the number of shards, until around 1 million
nodes are active in the system. A testbed with 1800 active
nodes manages to reach 1218 Transactions per Second (TPS)
of July 2020 [8]. Zilliqa implements a hybrid consensus mech-
anism. For authentication of the nodes, it implements a Proof-
of-Work (PoW) mechanism. Inside the shards, however, Zilliqa
employs a protocol based on Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT).
The entire BC is managed by a committee. At the beginning
of each epoch, a set of nodes is elected to participate in the
committee, which assigns incoming Tx to shards. Transactions
are sharded based on the address of the sender [8].
RapidChain proposes a sharding based BC [18]. Rapid-
Chain creates multiple committees, which are similar to
shards. During the bootstrap phase, a reference committee is
elected which is in charge of partitioning the set of nodes
in the BC into separate committees. Each node stores 1/k
of the BC, where k denotes the total amount of committees
in the system. The committees have to be reconfigured after
each epoch. In order to perform the reconfiguration of the
committees as efficient as possible, and to easily add new
nodes to the BC, an adapted version of Harmony’s Cuckoo
Rule was implemented [18] [10]. It is claimed that using the
methods proposed by RapidChain and running 4000 nodes, a
TPS of 7380 could be reached [18].
QuarkChain proposes a two-layered approach. One layer
consists of the elastic sharded BC. Elastic in this context means
that the number of shards and nodes in the BC can vary. The
second layer consists of the root BC which is in charge of
confirming blocks from the shards [6]. The key challenge is
to have a computationally strong enough root layer in order
not to bottleneck the first layer. The highest TPS that could
be reached using Python was 55’039.58 TPS [16].
OmniLedger is a sharding-based BC and uses the UTXO
model to process Txs [9]. In order to combat sybil attacks, it
operates an identity BC which runs in parallel to the actual
BC where the Txs are processed [9]. It utilizes state blocks
as stable checkpoints which summarize the entire state of the
BC and for the assignment of Vs to shards [9]. The shards
in OmniLedger are called Optimistic Vs because they quickly
validate Tx and put them into a block, creating a commitment,
which with a high probabilistic likelihood won’t change. Those
blocks will then be checked again by the Core Vs. Once
accepted by the Core Vs, the blocks produced by the Optimistic
Vs are final. The Core Vs process blocks in parallel in order
to maximize the scalability of the system. OmniLedger is able
to reach 4000 TPS [9].
2) Discussion: The study on the related work shows that
DL designs offer a subset of entities with dedicated responsi-
bilities. However, it can be noticed that an attempt to reduce
or remove the inter-shard communications is missing in the
state of art related work. This applies to all other entities
(used for validation or establishing a consensus) used within
the introduced DLs, as well. These interesting approaches
are limited in some facets such as lacking a proper Tx re-
validation mechanism such as in Bazo [1], or they are not
using any techniques to reduce the amount of the data stored
in the DLs especially for IoT data. Moreover, there has
been no precocious techniques applied in the related work
to proactively consider the networking instability all of which
will not allow the DLs to achieve a high scalability.
Another missing element is the storage optimizations e.g.,
with Tx aggregation, integrated with the sharding approaches
to limit the BC size growth. Especially for the IoT use cases
where a large number of data transactions flow towards a BC.
III. DLIT DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION
To develop a scalable sharding mechanism for IoT use
cases, DLIT is designed as a DL for small-to-medium size
networks with the goal of reducing inter-shard communi-
cations for higher scalability. Comparable to related work,
DLIT is designed in two layers, i.e., (i) Committee (CM)
and (ii) Validators (Vs). The novelty of the DLIT design
includes roles, which moderate the power entities can obtain.
While reducing the inter-shard communication dependency of
the entire DL, DLIT materializes a highly reliable validation
processes monitoring the integrity of the full DL.
The DLIT CM is an entity, where its members do not
participate in the validation process performed within shards.
For an efficient Tx management, the CM assigns Txs to Vs in
shards and performs necessary validation and authentication
steps to make DLIT a trustworthy DL. Vs are provided with
Txs, which they need to validate at a particular step in the
DL. Thus, DLIT Vs do not have their own Tx database, and
they do not communicate with other shard Vs. Therefore,
less redundancy at the shards level is reached. Moreover, Tx
rebroadcasts are not necessary anymore, since Vs are already
provided with the Tx they need. Thus, a global view of Txs
inside shards is obsolete. DLIT Vs no longer have to fetch,
store, and delete Tx that they never validated earlier.
Two CM entity types exist: CM members and leaders.
A leader exists in shards, too, who is the leader for one
epoch being elected by the CM in a randomized leader
assignment mechanism of the previous epoch. The CM leader
is responsible for assigning Tx to shards and also to run a BFT
CM inside the CM to come to an agreement, if malicious
behavior is detected in DLIT. Meanwhile, all CM members
validate the DL. In order to restrict the CM leader’s power
of a certain height, the CM leader of epoch n is responsible
for the BFT of epoch n − 1. If a user joins the V pool, he
automatically becomes a V, with the chance of becoming the
leader in every following epoch. If the user joins the CM pool,
he automatically becomes a CM member, with the chance of
becoming the leader in every following epoch, too.
A. IoT Data Transactions
Since the main focus of DLIT is preserving IoT data, a
specific data Tx is dedicated for this purpose. The data Tx
(DataTx) can be used to send data from one address to another
and store this Tx inside the DL. DataTx follows the same
principles as other Tx types in DLIT, such as the funds Tx.
DataTx have to be signed by initiators i.e., clients, using the
Elliptic Curve Digital Signature (ECDSA) algorithm. The CM
distributes the DataTXs among all the shards.
1) Transaction Aggregation: For scalability reasons DLIT
extends the Tx aggregation approach of [14] to DataTx.
DLIT enables aggregation of any amount of DataTxs to an
aggregated DataTx based on the sender/receiver address within
the limits of a block size. The main benefit of this process is
to save memory in the DL by requiring to store only one
aggregated Tx instead of all Txs individually.
2) Transaction Management & Assignment: Since Vs do
not have a global view of all Txs anymore, they rely on the
CM to supply them with a portion of the total Tx pool with
Txs that have not been validated yet. As shown in Fig. 4-a, at
the beginning of each epoch, the CM evaluates the number of
Vs in the system and assigns to each of them a partition of the
pool of open Txs according to the public address of the Txs’
sender. In order to do that, a new data type Tx assignment
is introduced in DLIT. It includes all Txs from the global Tx
pool that have been assigned to a specific V at the time of the
creation of this assignment. Shifting the responsibility for the
Tx sharding to the CM avoids multiple executions of the same
task in each shard and effectively makes Vs light-weight.
Fig. 3. Transaction Assignment and Validation in DLIT
After a block is mined, it contains a set of Txs according to
the Tx aggregation mechanism. The mined block is broadcast
to the network to be validated by CM members. Moreover, the
state transition is sent out to the entire network for synchro-
nization and validation purposes. When CM receive the mined
block, removed the validated Txs from the open pool (red
circles) and re-assign the remaining Txs (the green circles) to
the miners in shards. DLIT’s Tx assignment and management
mechanism function at a V fills up the local mempool of the V
with Txs, once the assignment was performed. The V chooses
the optimal combination of Txs to be added to the block (green
circles). After the block’s creation, both the Txs that were
validated and the ones that were not validated are deleted from
the V’s mempool (cf. Fig. 4-b).
The CM, upon reception of the block from Vs, fetches all
Txs, which were included in the block and writes them to the
closed Txs pool. The same set of Txs is also deleted from the
open Tx pool. E.g., in a 3 shard - 1 CM configuration, first,
the global open Tx pool is loaded into the memory of the
CM leader. In turn, the entire pool is divided into 3 different
partitions, each representing one shard. Those partitions are
sent by the CM leader to Vs assigned to each shard. The Txs
validated inside the block are deleted from the mempool. All
remaining Txs are sent out again to all Vs assigned. By keeping
track of all Txs, which were not validated by Vs, the CM does
not have to force Vs to validate all Txs that were assigned. Txs
not validated will be taken into the Tx assignment mechanism
at the next block height again.
B. Communication and Synchronization
DLIT keeps the communication networking overhead as low
as possible. Thus, a light-weight synchronization mechanism
reduces inter-shard communications. Moreover, the commu-
nication between the CM and Vs has been designed to be
minimal. DLIT requires the V-CM synchronization to keep
a global view of open Txs and to decide, which V validates
which Txs at a certain height. Without synchronization, mali-
cious behavior, such as double spending, could be possible.
1) Inter-Shard Communication and Synchronization: DLIT
could distribute the task of aggregating state transitions to a
global state to all shards, thus, the same task is performed by
all Vs. Also, all state transitions have to be sent to all other Vs.
If the total amount of Vs is denoted as n, the basic sharding
mechanism leads to a total of
n∗(n−1)
2 connections that have
to be active. Moreover, a total of n∗ (n−1) messages have to
be sent inside the network at each block height. This leads to
a complexity of O(n2) messages in the system at each block
height, which DLIT avoids.
DLIT solves this problem by fixing the epoch length to one.
Thus, state transitions are created and distributed by all Vs, and
they are applied as well as aggregated by the leader before
creating the epoch block. The last step of deleting Txs that
were validated by other Vs is omitted, because the leader does
not see those Txs in the mempool. Note that since only the
leader V has to receive state transitions, the size of messages
for each block height is reduced to O(n). This mechanism
guarantees that the shard leader is up to date after receiving
all state transitions. Exactly for this reason, it is the leader’s
task to create the epoch block with the updated global state in
it, such that other shards and the CM synchronize the global
state as well, along with the shard and CM leader assignment
DLIT only requires all shards to communicate with shard
1. In comparison to a regular sharding mechanism, where all
miners need to send their state to each other, DLIT requires
a reduced amount of communications. Fig. 4 illustrates the
communication between 4 shards in DLIT. Dashed lines
indicate inter-shard communications, which are not required
by DLIT. Clearly ,fewer communications enable a decreased
probability of packet loss and faster synchronization of miners.
Hence, DLIT is less affected by unstable networks.
Fig. 4. Inter-shard Synchronization in DLIT
2) Inter-Committee Communication and Synchronization:
Just like for shards, CM members need to synchronize with
each other, since it is essential that they work on identical data
to keep their mempools synchronized. It should be irrelevant
for shards how many members the CM has, because the
CM acts as a synchronized and unified entity. The inter-
CM communication designed enables the CM to decentralize
power by running the validation task not only in one node,
but in all CM nodes in parallel, thus, coming to a unified
and definitive decision in the end. To achieve that, all CM
members receive the Tx assignment from the CM leader, such
that every member has identical data to work with while vali-
dating. During the validation process, each CM node performs
identical steps using identical data, which will, in the end,
help them find a consensus of which nodes acted maliciously.
This is reached, since CM member send out a CM check,
containing information about which nodes they identified as
being malicious. Since only the leader has to process those
messages and like for inter-shard communications, it is a major
concern to keep the total amount of required messages for
inter-CM communications as low as possible. Thus, only the
leader sends out the Tx assignment to other members, and only
the leader receives CM check messages from other members,
leading to a complexity of O(n) of sent messages, as opposed














Fig. 5. DLIT’s Validator-Committee Communication and Synchronization
3) Validator-Committee Communication and Synchroniza-
tion: Communications between the CM and Vs is grouped into
two types: (i) sending out Tx assignments and (ii) validating
blocks and the epoch block. At each block height, Vs have
to wait for the CM’s Tx assignment. The reception of this Tx
assignment is the starting point for mining a new block. Once
the CM received and validated all blocks, it can build the new
global open Tx pool with remaining, not validated Txs. After
the reception of the epoch block with its V’s shard assignment,
it is ready to partition the global open Tx pool according to
these Vs again. An epoch block with height h can only arrive
at the CM, if all blocks in the epoch with height h have been
mined and after all Tx assignments have been received.
The synchronization happening at these communications
guarantees that Vs and the CM are always at the same
block height. Figure 5 shows a simplified state machine for
DLIT’s CM-V communications. A transition to the next state
is depicted by a solid arrow, while messages are represented
by dashed arrows. Upon incoming messages, the machine halts
until all required incoming messages have arrived. Effectively,
those communications at both state machines enables them to
be synchronized. E.g., by construction it is not possible to send
two consecutive Tx assignments before a block for the first Tx
assignment has been mined and sent to the network.
Finally, the V-CM communication is used for updating the
closed mempool. Since all CM members validate all blocks,
they can write Txs, which were contained in blocks to the
closed mempool. Furthermore, to synchronize the global state
of Vs with the global state of the CM and to communicate the
new shard and CM leader assignments, all CM members also
validate epoch blocks.
C. Authentication and Validation
While the authentication ensures that commitment keys are
checked, validation ensures that DLIT’s Txs follow the rules.
1) Authentication Strategy: DLIT state transitions, just
like blocks and epoch blocks, have to be signed using the
Vs’ private commitment key via an RSA signature mecha-
nism. Using the public commitment key, publicly available
in the DL state, the validity of the key can be checked. In
a similar fashion, inter-CM communications and the shard-
CM communication is equipped with signatures and checks,
such that no malicious node inside or outside DLIT can
assume a wrong identity. Therefore, the authenticity concerns
of communications are settled.
2) Validation Strategy: The CM checks (i) whether Vs did
include Txs in their block that were not assigned to them
and (ii) if state transitions that they produced correspond to
actually validated Txs. A DLIT CM creates its own state
transition based on Txs that were put inside the block and
compares it to the state transition, which was produced by the
shard. The check for validity of this state transition is crucial,
since without checks any number of Txs could be included
in the relative state, remaining undetected. This is because
the block creation and state transition creation processes are
decoupled. Therefore, even if the block produced is valid, it is
possible that the state transition contains wrong information.
The task of the first DLIT shard, called the shard leader,
is to aggregate all state transitions with its own state and to
consolidate it in the epoch block. In turn, all other nodes in
the network accept the global state from that epoch block. The
validity (and authenticity) of the epoch block is, therefore,
crucial within a trustworthy system. Since authenticity was
already addressed by previous implementations, the validity
check in DLIT are performed by CM via aggregating all
relative states from all shards in the system, creating an
aggregated relative state and comparing that relative state to
the difference between the epoch block being checked and the
epoch block of the previous height.
D. Implementation and Consensus Mechanism
The DLIT implementation is based on the PoS-based Bazo
BC [14] and [1], for which details and source code are
available at [3] and [2]. Most importantly, the DLIT consensus
is twofold, including the shard and the CM side.
Consensus on shards: The shard leader in S1 operates in
a special role inside the shard pool. Before being able to mine
a block, the Tx assignment has to arrive from the CM, then a
block is mined. The leader waits for all state transitions from
other shards (2 ... N) and requests missing ones, if necessary.
For each state transition, it updates its local state by applying
the relative state. After all state transitions have been processed
the leader operates on the updated current global state of
the DL as the only shard node with this global information.
Therefore, it produces (a) the epoch block containing the
global state and (b) a new random validator shard assignment
to assign a new random CM leader.
In contrast to other shards, where validators have to wait
for the Tx assignment to mine a block and to send out the
state transition, shard leader wait for the epoch block to arrive
to take over the new global state along with the new shard
assignment. From a shard’s perspective, consensus is reached.
Consensus in Committee: At the beginning of each round,
only the CM leader is active by running the BFT consensus
mechanism, slashing malicious nodes of the previous round,
and creating/sending Tx assignments. Other CM members
have to wait to receive all Tx assignments before being able
to continue.Afterwards, all CM members behave similarly,
starting to listen to, requesting, and authenticating blocks and















Fig. 6. Inter-Committee Communications in DLIT
This parallel execution ensures that DLIT saves time for
fetching state transitions from the network. During a block
validation, the validity of PoS and Txs contained is checked.
A relative state is constructed to validate state transitions at the
next step, which will be entered once both previous steps are
performed. State transitions and the epoch block are validated.
TABLE I
COMPARISON OF DLIT WITH RELATED WORK
Zilliqa Rapidchain QuarkChain Omniledger DLIT
Use case Decentralized Apps Fund Transactions General Fund Transactions IoT data
Consensus Hybrid of PoW/BFT BFT-based Hybrid (Boson) ByzCoinX Hybrid of BFT/PoS
Authentication Committee Committee per shard Committee Identity BC, Core
Validator
Committee
Scalability (TPS) 1,200 at 1,800 nodes 7,300 at 4,000 nodes 50,000 (local setup) 1,800 at favorable
conditions with low
number of adversaries
1,300 TPS in unsta-
ble networks with 3
shards
Permission Public permissionless Public permissionless Public permissionless Public permissionless Private consortium
Next, the epoch block with its new state and assignments is
accepted, and all CM members send out their CM checks
naming members, who acted maliciously in that round. Those
CM checks can be used by the CM leader in the next round
for running the BFT consensus mechanism.
Slashing is referred to as the process to detect and fine
malicious nodes. DLIT regulates slashing through the BFT
consensus mechanism. Since all CM members validate the
work of all validators at the end of each round, CM members
prepare a summary of all nodes for which they detected
malicious behavior. Thus, they create a CM check, containing
all validator addresses who acted maliciously as well as all
CM member addresses who acted maliciously in the epoch.
The message is then signed and broadcast to the network.
In the next epoch, the new CM leader collects all of those
CM checks and based on the complete set of these, performs
the BFT consensus mechanism. The mechanism is based on
voting, which means that based on the total amount of CM
members in the system, a certain amount of those has to vote to
slash a specific node in the DL. Thus, if no node in the network
acts maliciously, consensus is reached in shards without an
active intervention by the CM. For all members of the DL, the
epoch block serves as a synchronization of the global state. If
malicious behavior is detected, consensus can only be reached
by applying slashing, which issues fine Txs.
E. IoT Data Storage Mechanism
Whenever a data Tx is validated, the committee takes the
data from the Tx and stores it in DLIT. For each DLIT client
account, the committee maintains the data structure called
“data summary". The data summary consists of an Address
field, i.e., the sender’s address, and a Data field, i.e., a slice
of bytestreams. It has the type [][]byte and stores data that
the sender sent to the network. DataTxs contains all DataTxs
from the respective block, storing the IoT data in addition to
the address of the sender as the key to access this slice. Thus,
a global and updated view of the data in the DL is kept at all
times. For higher efficiency, a map is created with the sender
as the key and all sender’s DataTx are added in a slice as the
respective value. This map is filled by iterating through the
entire slice of DataTxs to be added. Then, the database will
be iterated by sender. In each round, the database is checked, if
there is already a “data summary" for a sender. If so, it will be
fetched, otherwise a new “data summary" will be created. By
iterating through all DataTxs from the respective sender the
bytestreams contained in individual DataTxs are appended to
the slice in this “data summary". After all DataTxs have been
handled, the “data summary" is written back to the database.
IV. EVALUATIONS
The DLIT performance has been evaluated within a local
test set-up of 60 wallets, partitioned into 8 separate partitions,
each sending 3,000 Txs within the shards 1-4. The block
size was kept at 800 Byte and Txs were sent in batches,
ensuring that Txs from as many different wallets as possible
are available in the open mempool.
Fig. 7 overviews performance results in TPS for DLIT. It
can be seen that with the different numbers of CM mem-
bers and the number of shards adding shards increases the
performance, while adding CM members indicates a higher
communication overhead. Within this experiment the number
of shards with a single CM member show the best perfor-
mance. Also, it can be observed that the sharding mechanism
shows the potential of a scalability benefit, since DLIT’s use
with larger number of shards and one CM member behave
well. This is due to the enhanced transaction management,
since time-intense DL work is distributed among these shards.
However, once the 3 shards threshold is reached, adding more
miners does not improve the scalability further. The reason
for this is the larger number of shards and CM members
requires more inter-shard and inter-CM communications, caus-
ing additive network delays and security processing, which
determines the current trade-off against scalability. Especially
within unstable networks this situation is more visible.
If DLIT shall validate Txs at the highest possible pace, a
small CM needs to be determined. If security concerns prevail,
a larger CM is advisable at the cost of smaller TPS. The
prototypical evaluation has shown that for a configuration of
2 CM members and 3 shards a moderate centralization of the
CM was reached, while benefits in performance are gained
via the sharding mechanism. While DLIT ic compared with
related work (cf. Table I), it can be concluded that DLIT is a
scalable DL, which, even with a limited number of validators
and only a few shards, offers a high Tx validation rate.
V. SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK
This paper proposed and evaluated DLIT, a new “Distributed
Ledger for IoT Data". For reaching data persistence in the
Fig. 7. DLIT Performance Results
Internet-of-Things (IoT), DLIT is based on the two consensus
layers of Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT) and Proof-of-Stake
(PoS) and maintained by two entities of Committees and
Validators. DLIT reduces or even removes the need for inter-
shard communications in many cases discussed. Based on the
secure Tx block validation mechanism, DLIT implements a
slashing mechanism to fine malicious nodes. Finally, DLIT
divides the Tx assignment, validation, verification, and storage
responsibility between nodes and employs a Tx aggregation
mechanism to reach a moderate DL size growth as the first
sharded DL employing such a technique for IoT data.
To reach even higher TPS rates it is planned to improve
this version of a DLIT committee by applying a partial BFT
consensus mechanism. Moreover, evaluations of DLIT with an
increased number of nodes on the committee and shard sides
are foreseen.
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